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     This chapter aims at demonstrating that the analysis of the diplomatic documentation 
 preserved under the auspices of the Historical Archive of Itamaraty enables us to formulate hy-
 potheses concerning official Brazilian imagery of Japan and the Japanese people between 1897 and 
 1942. The period under consideration here began with the establishment of the Legation of Brazil 
 in Tokyo and ended with the rupture of diplomatic relations between Brazil and Japan in the context 
 of the Second World War. 
     The collection of documents, telegrams, and dispatches issued and received by the Ministry 
 of Foreign Affairs provides us with resources to establish the movements of Brazilian diplomacy 
 in order to influence the political "chess game" in which the issue of the Japanese immigration to 
 Brazil was one major part. Such movements took place not only at the moments of critical impact 
 on the subject, as in the situation regarding the anti-Japanese amendments presented during the 
 Constitution Act 1934, but also during times when "normality" prevailed in the relations between 
 the two nations. 
     I have opted not to make a deep study on the Constitution Act 1934 or the role of Itamaraty in 
 the debates over this act, as there are already a number of academic papers that have explored this 
 issue. I However, I will point out that it has not been only in the situation of constitutional revision 
 that our diplomacy was decisive. 
     First of all, it is important to note that, although the imagery of Japan had already been present 
 even before June 18, 1908, when the 781 pioneers aboard the Kasato-rnaru arrived in Santos, the 
 effective beginning of the Japanese immigration would evidence and consolidate the images and 
 stereotypes around those foreigners. What did those images consist or. 
     From the nineteenth to the twentieth century, Brazilians gleaned information on Japan 
primarily through the filter of travel literature produced by Europeans who visited the Rising Sun 
Empire after Japanese ports reopened to trade with the West following the signing of a treaty with 
 the United States in 1854. References to the mysterious land of cherry trees, geishas, and samurais 
 fostered the phenomenon called japonisme. The Japanese archipelago emerged as an exotic and 
preserved territory incomparable to the Western world. 
     A fever for Japan was spread, therefore, by travelers' reports or, again, through the activity 
 of collectors attracted by prints, lacquerware, sculptures, porcelain, screen paintings, and other 
 typically Japanese objects. In addition to the original side of the empire, other circumstances con-
tributed to the making of a national imagery of Japan: its isolation, which had provided Japanese 
political, cultural and racial homogeneity, made Japan seem unique, and there was widespread 
admiration for the rapid Japanese modernization as well as the military victories over China (1895)
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and especially over Russia (1905).1 
    Effectively, the Brazilian elite had the Japanese case as a model for the republican regime 
recently established. It was, however, a contradictory and ambiguous model, especially when the 
hypothesis of Japanese workforce for coffee fanning was put forth. Such ambiguity was exactly due 
to the racial theories that held sway in Europe in the second half of the nineteenth century, which 
obtained wide acceptance among Brazil's intelligentsia. Those who held political power were fa-
vorable to the progressive whitening of the population, through the encouragement of the European 
immigration. The "purification" of the Brazilian race was taken as a sine qua non condition for 
Brazil's attaining recognition as one of the modem and developed nations. 
    Thus, the definition of ethnic groups which could contribute to the national culture was con-
sidered essential by our elite for the role Brazil would assume before the so-called civilized world. 
The "thinking of the nation" in terms of race was originated in the formation of the Brazilian re-
public, ruled by liberal institutions, imported from the U.S.A. and Europe, and the maintenance of 
oligarchic values and the power in the hands of the agricultural elite, as demonstrated in studies by 
4 Elias Tom6 Saliba' and Roberto Schwarz. 
    Hence the hypothesis of importing Japanese workforce assumed the insertion of Mongol 
blood in a melting-pot which had already been considered compromised by "inferior" races-the 
Negro and indigenous. After the abolition of slavery in 1888 and the exclusion of the Negro in the 
free work system, the coffee oligarchy began to encourage European immigration, particularly by 
Italian settlers. Nevertheless, the instability verified during the permanence of those workers on the 
farms and the uprisings caused by exploitation and mistreatment, motivated our elite to look for 
alternatives such as the Japanese, who were seen as more gentle and sensible. 
    In this new context, the Brazilian government intended to establish treaties with China and 
Japan, particularly the latter, target of political admiration as a consequence of its dynamic progress 
within a few decades. The first step was the negotiation of a treaty of friendship and trade between 
the respective countries in 1892. However, as Japan demanded to sign an equal treaty, it was post-
poned until November 5, 1895, when it was celebrated in Paris as the Treaty of Trade and Shipping 
between Brazil and Japan. 
    Itamaraty requested the Resident Minister in Paris, Gabriel de Toledo Piza, to delete men-
tion that the Brazilian consuls in Japan would be nominated due to the trading convenience. Then 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs made it known at that moment that it was interested in discussing 
5 the immigration issue with Japan. Afterwards, in August, 1897, the Japanese Legation in Rio de 
Janeiro was established, and one month later the Brazilian Legation opened in Tokyo. Brazil's first 
official envoy to Japan was Henrique Carlos Ribeiro Lisboa. 
    Although the historical literature demonstrates that there was no strong interest in sending 
Japanese subjects to Brazil until the U.S.A. imposed restrictions on immigration by Japanese na-
tionals in 1907, the diplomatic documentation kept in the Historical Archive of Itamaraty (RJ) at-
tests that there was official Brazilian resistance to the Japanese even before that.' 
    We can perceive through the analysis of the correspondence exchanged between Itamaraty 
and the diplomatic representation in Tokyo that, in addition to the racial issue, they were afraid that
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those immigrants would trigger political and economic disorder in the country of destination. Those 
who were against the Japanese immigration referred to the North-American example, stating that 
the Japanese based in California had caused disagreements because they were satisfied with lower 
wages than whites demanded, and moreover Japanese migrants were suspected of infiltrating North 
American society in order to prepare the Japanese military invasion. In short, if Japan was admired 
as a nation in some respects, it was not as an immigrant supplier. 
    In the first years of Brazil-Japan relations, the role of Itamaraty in this context may be in-
stanced through the role of two Brazilian diplomats, who were particularly against the Japanese 
and whose language lacked the usual diplomatic tone: Manoel de Oliveira Lima, Chargd d'affaires 
of the Legation from June 22, 1901 to May 10, 1903, and Luis Guimardes, Charg6 d'affaires from 
1906 to 1909. 
    Oliveira Lima, in his correspondence with Itamaraty, was concerned to warn against the in-
convenience of allowing Japanese to come to Brazil. He alleged political and racial reasons. During 
his term in Tokyo, he supported his arguments against the Japanese by sending Japanese newspaper 
articles reporting the problems that Japanese immigrants went through in the countries where they 
were received, predicting that the same would happen in our country. We cite, as an example, the 
official communication dated July 26, 1907, in which he sent an article published in the Japan Mail 
newspaper in English published in Yokohama, reporting the distress that the Japanese suffered in 
New Caledonia. Such a report was evidence, according to the diplomat, of the reasons why the gov-
ernment of Tokyo was led to encourage their subjects' departure and supervise their status abroad, 
demanding the same consideration given to immigrants from the "refined" countries of Europe and 
America. In short, the excessive susceptibility of the Japanese government recommended the coun-
tries which needed workforce, such as Brazil, to ponder more deeply.7 
    The warnings from the Brazilian Legation in Japan grew more alarmed when diplomats there 
received the information that the government of Sdo Paulo had signed a contract with the trader 
Marcial Sanz, which provided for 600 Japanese families coming to Brazil. Francisco de Paula 
Rodrigues Alves, at that time President of Sdo Paulo, requested Itamaraty to assign its Charg6 
d'affaires in Japan the task of facilitating Elorz' negotiations with the Japanese authorities. Oliveira 
Lima, in an official communication of September 15, 1901, characterized this immigration as "un-
desirable."' He cited as reasons, in addition to the incorporation of an inferior race to the national 
organism, customs, morals, and psychology which were distant from the Aryan race, as well as the 
technical insufficiency of the Japanese farmhand with regard to working in large farmland. 
    His criticisms fell primarily upon the "Japanese race," which he believed to be the bearer 
of inherent and untouched characteristics that belied the image of civilization that the Rising Sun 
Empire had promoted in implementing its economical development. In his opinion, the Japanese 
as well as the Chinese did not assimilate into the nations which received them; they just intended 
to accumulate some capital so as to return to "their mountains" as soon as possible. The difficulties 
they would have in adapting to Brazil would certainly cause them to provoke conflicts such as those 
verified in New Caledonia.' 
    The acquiescence of Itamaraty to Oliveira Lima's statement can be verified in the note reg-
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istered on the first page of the official communication: a copy of this document was sent to the 
government of Sdo Paulo on November 16, 1901. However, Oliveira Lima evaluated that Elorz's 
businesses were not successful, as he himself requested, through the Legation in Tokyo, to change 
the terms of the contract, so as to substitute Chinese for Japanese. The diplomat evaluated this 
change as positive, since he considered the Chins "more hardworking and accommodating" than 
the Japanese.9 
     In a highly pugnacious position, Luis Guimardes condemned, through a document addressed 
to Carlos Botelho, Secretary of Agriculture of Sdo Paulo, the attempt to import Japanese workers 
to Brazil, through a contract signed between Ryu Mizuno (Mizuno Rya h(V711 1859-195 1) and 
the government of Sdo Paulo." His term in charge of the diplomatic representation in Japan was 
marked by continuation of the intolerance with regard to Japanese immigration that had been ex-
pressed by Manoel de Oliveira Lima. From October 1906 to June 1908, Luis Gumardes, through 
reserved official communications, stated his contrary opinion to the project of Sdo Paulo. Not only 
did Guimardes express his disagreement, but on several occasions he also requested Itamaraty to 
intervene in avoiding its realization. 
     GuimarAes' thought incorporated many negative notions of the Japanese, such as that they 
did not assimilate to the customs of their new country, but instead tried to impose their own; Japan 
was a power to which one needed to render accounts; Japanese settlers complained daily, disturbing 
the governments that received them; the Japanese people considered themselves the most powerful 
and perfect on earth, which could represent a political danger to the future;" the Japanese would 
dislodge the national and foreign worker by accepting any pittance. He prophesied a future war be-
tween the U.S.A. and Japan for control of San Francisco, Hawaii, and the Philippines. In short, the 
importation of Japanese would be a "real calamity,"" as if we had "an enemy at home."" 
    In addition to the social-political issues, Luis Guimardes adduced some eugenic arguments: 
the Mongol blood and the ugliness of the Japanese race would compromise the formation of the 
Brazilian race. The cross of a heterogeneous race with an inferior one would result in "degeneration, 
degradation, hybridism"11 and in a contact with a "disdainful, aggressive and tricky people," who 
were demanding a proportional reaction from their country to the humiliations they suffered on the 
west coast of America. 
    Guimardes' intervention to the "discreet opposition" of the Brazilian diplomacy regarding the 
plans of Sdo Paulo, resulted in an exchange of correspondence among Itamaraty, the Legation of 
Brazil in Tokyo, and Carlos Botelho. Botelho sent Guimardes a dispatch on April 25, 1908, enclos-
ing the contract signed with the Imperial Company of Emigration. Through this document, Botelho 
informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Sdo Paulo did not intend to implement the Japanese 
settlement, but the workforce training before the embarrassment offered by the European nations to 
the departure of their nationals." 
    However, Guimardes took note solely of the fact that only Brazil accepted the Japanese while 
the other countries refused them. He warned, "Sooner or later the Japanese will cause great dis-
agreements in our country. The Japanese, Sir Minister, remains Japanese for all their life; they are 
bom spies, our enemies in their blood, conceited to death and sowers of all kind of coriftision. 1116
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    The opposition of Itamaraty, attested by the copies of official communications Guimardes 
sent to the government of Sdo Paulo and to the Ministry of Agriculture, was not enough to frustrate 
the beginning of the Japanese immigration movement to Brazil. It did mean that immigration began 
in an atmosphere of debates and polemic. 
    Thus, it can be stated that the stance of Itamaraty was directly associated with the racial and 
political issues in which the protagonist was the Rising Sun Empire. Accordingly, from the first 
decade of the twentieth century to the beginning of 1942, when the diplomatic relations between 
these countries were broken off, our chancellery thoroughly observed the Japanese imperialist ac-
tions in Asia. 
    The aspects of major interest, which can be inferred from the official communications sent 
by Brazilian diplomats in Tokyo through the end of the 1920s, referred to the conflicts verified be-
tween the Japanese immigrants in California and the white workers. The Brazilian representatives 
followed frequent reports on the reactions of public opinion and the government of Japan against 
the intentions of the California state legislature to debate proposals of laws that would have exclud-
ed Japanese children from public schools or prevented Japanese citizens from acquiring California 
real estate. Gustavo de Vianna Kelsch, who had replaced Manoel Carlos Gongalves Pereira, Envoy 
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Minister in Tokyo, in charge of the Legation, speculated on April 
1913, that the Japanese dissatisfaction could lead to an armed conflict between the U.S.A. and 
Japan. 17 
    However, in spite of the concerns raised by the supposed "Japanese infiltration," The Rising 
Sun Empire was a power of weight and even Kelsch, under the order of Itamaraty, would negotiate 
an arbitration treaty with Japan in the same year, 1913. In an official communication sent to the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Francisco R6gis de Oliveira, Kelsch wrote that according to the instruc-
tions received he would "ably" consult the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Gaimush6) about that issue, 
observing the possibility that the current Japanese government could have a different opinion on the 
issue from that of the previous government in 1911. 11 
    Due to the fact that the Japanese government did not show interest in establishing that treaty 
with Brazil, Kelsch did not succeed. He observed that the Brazilian government had been making 
all the concessions to the Japanese, facing at times "serious oppositions." He instanced some ex-
amples of what he regarded as "Japanese unwillingness": "If we request the boarding of some of 
our Navy officials on ships of the Japanese squadron, they refuse it. If we want to establish an hon-
orary Consulate in Pard, they refuse it. If we propose signing an arbitration treaty, they postpone it 
indefinitely."" He suggested retaliating against such attitudes by moving the Legation to Peking and 
refusing any future concession to the Japanese immigration. As for this last matter, he stated that he 
shared the same opinion as all his antecedents, who were also against this immigration movement. 
    Effectively, it has been verified that the sample of documents cited do not reflect an isolated 
attitude of some diplomats, but had the approval of Itarnaraty, which consented to the anti-Japanese 
concepts expressed by their representatives' dispatches from Japan. Confidential dispatches reaf-
firmed that the Japanese immigration was not convenient to Brazil, alleging that the Japanese did 
not assimilate to "anywhere they go to and to the inhabitants of the country.""
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    We emphasize that signs of persistence can be identified in those manifestations, as they re-
peat the same points on different occasions. Even more important, the judgments issued by the Bra-
zilian Chancellery were not restricted to that, but served as a means to persuade the states which re-
ceived the Japanese immigrants to change their immigration policy. This situation may be instanced 
in the reply of Itaniaraty to a request by Epaminondas Leite Chermont. Chermont had taken charge 
as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Brazil in Japan on September 21, 1915. 
    In a reserved communication of December 12, 1916, Chermont remarked that the Japanese 
press served the Japanese government as a means of propaganda to stimulate the Japanese emigra-
tion to Brazil, concerning which he had always had reservations. He stated that the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs should put together all the official communications the Legation had sent on the 
Japanese immigration since 1901 in order to resend them to the government of Sao Paulo, so as to 
avoid repeating "what had been said and repeated by this Legation many times." He said further that 
had no other intention but "to defend the future interests of Brazil which were really threatened. 1121 
    In reply, Greg6rio Pecegueiro, General Director of Itamaraty, informed the representative in 
Tokyo that Minister Lauro Muller had already requested to review all the official communications 
on the issue, and all of them contained unfavorable information on the Japanese emigration and 
showed the inconveniences regarding the declared intention of preventing the entry of Japanese. He 
added that Minas Gerais and Sao Paulo had signed contracts with the Japanese and had notified the 
                              21 Ministry of Agriculture of this. 
    After Sao Paulo had cut the subsidy for Japanese immigration, in 1922, and the North-Amer-
ican Congress promulgated the Law ofNational Origin, in 1924, barring future Japanese immigra-
tion to the U.S.A., Japan resumed sending its subjects to Brazil. Reacting to the new picture of 
Japanese immigration, the Brazilian representation in Japan, elevated to Embassy level, followed 
the issue, which had been the main shared interest between the two nations since the beginning of 
bilateral relations. 
    The suspicions of the Brazilian intelligentsia, mirrored in our diplomacy, that the Japanese 
immigration had political purposes arose from the fact that the departure of poor Japanese from 
their native country began for capitalist reasons. The late development of the Japanese capitalism 
began in the context of competition among Western countries to create settlements abroad and, for 
that reason, assumed imperialist characteristics of increasing economic power through territorial 
          21 expansion. Such situation was concerning the land acquisition by Japanese companies in Brazil, 
where colonization companies were installed such as those administered by the Society of Colo-
nization in Brazil (Yagen Sekinin Burajiru Takushoku. - BRATAC) and Kaigai K6gya Kabushiki 
Kaisha (KKKK). 
    A new stage of the Japanese immigration to Brazil had started, but our diplomacy did not 
change its viewpoint. The content of the official communications sent by the Brazilian Embassy 
attests that the anti-Japanese sentiments remained based on the same (questionable) allegations: 
the Japanese assimilation problem, their racial inferiority, and the political danger represented by 
the immigrants located at strategic points of the national territory. Thus, the official documentation 
expresses the inquietudes of the Brazilian elite with regard to the acquisition of pieces of land to
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implement agricultural settlements in Brazil, such as the donation of ten billion acres of land by the 
government of Pard and the establishment of settlement in the Amazon region in 1929. Again, the 
concept of "Japanese infiltration" was on the agenda. 
    The diplomats were concerned and followed these movements, on different occasions inter-
preting them not simply as Japanese immigration, but as imperialist expansion motivated by the 
overpopulation and scarcity of natural resources. The decade of the 1930s brought, in addition to 
a significant increase of Japanese immigration, a heightening of our authorities' attention to the 
Japanese military campaign in Asia. The Manchurian Incident of 1931 and the establishment of a 
figurehead state, Manchukuo, in the region on February 18, 1932, are facts frequently registered 
in the documentation of the Historical Archive of Itamaraty, until affairs in northeast Asia were 
supplanted from the news by the repercussions of the anti-Japanese amendments presented at the 
National Constituent Assembly in 1933. 
    In the face of political developments in Brazil-the ascension of Getillio Vargas through the 
Revolution of 1930, the nationalist and xenophobic aspect of his government, the amendments 
presented by the anti-Japanese element in the National Constituent Assembly-Itarnaraty shifted 
the stance it had adopted until that moment. Given the concrete possibility of diplomatic conflicts 
between Brazil and Japan, a negotiation between the ministries of foreign affairs of both countries 
and political forces of the Assembly began, with the objective of preventing the approval of directly 
discriminatory amendments. 
    However, the crisis at that time did not represent a change in the course of the Brazilian di-
plomacy. The official communications sent by the Brazilian representation in the following years 
reflected the situation that would lead to the Second World War and the rupture of diplomatic rela-
tions between Brazil and Japan, on January 29, 1942. The information sent to Itamaraty outlined the 
Japanese imperialist actions and speculated that the loyalty of Japanese subjects might be converted 
to the loyalty to the Axis, thereby endangering the national security of our country. 
    The research on the diplomatic documentation provides us important components to evaluate 
that period, which concluded in a break of relations between the respective countries that lasted un-
til 1952. The tension felt in the final moments before the rupture may be verified in a precise internal 
report of which occurred on February 2, 1942, date on which the ambassadors F. de Castello-Branco 
Clark would communicate the cessation of diplomatic relations. The Japanese army and police had 
surrounded and occupied the Embassy. The ambassador reported in a memorandum that from that 
moment all of the embassy employees, including him, were held incommunicado. The psychologi-
cal shock caused by the attitude of the Japanese government, classified as "abrupt, severe and inel-
egant," might actually have caused the death of the wife of the embassy First Secretary, Nabuco de 
       24 Abreu. That occupation would last more than two months, and it concluded a critical phase in the 
history of the diplomatic relations between Brazil and Japan. 
    It was a phase in which the importation of Japanese immigrants to a land of completely dif-
ferent culture and customs, gave rise to feelings of strangeness and distrust on both sides. It was 
not possible in this brief chapter to cover details of the course of the official Brazilian anti-Japanese 
attitude, but we were able to pinpoint some important aspects. Nevertheless, the present good re-
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lations between Brazil and Japan-an undeniable reality-were built on a basis full of conflicts, 
xenophobia, and racism. And the most important point of this essay is that Itamaraty effectively 
helped to create and reinforce a stigmatized image of the Japanese immigrant, considered as the 
other, who should be avoided, by means of a "discreet opposition" to. the Japanese intentions of 
sending their population surplus to the racial democracy paradise.
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